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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To minimise adverse events in healthcare,
various large-scale incident reporting and learning
systems have been developed worldwide. Nevertheless,
learning from patient safety incidents is going slowly.
Local, unit-based reporting systems can help to get
faster and more detailed insight into unit-specific safety
issues. The aim of our study was to gain insight into
types and causes of patient safety incidents in hospital
units and to explore differences between unit types.
Design: Prospective observational study.
Setting: 10 emergency medicine units, 10 internal
medicine units and 10 general surgery units in 20
hospitals in the Netherlands participated. Patient safety
incidents were reported by healthcare providers.
Reports were analysed with root cause analysis. The
results were compared between the 3 unit types.
Results: A total of 2028 incidents were reported in an
average reporting period of 8 weeks per unit. More than
half had some consequences for patients, such as a
prolonged hospital stay or longer waiting time, and a
small number resulted in patient harm. Significant
differences in incident types and causes were found
between unit types. Emergency units reported more
incidents related to collaboration, whereas surgical and
internal medicine units reported more incidents related
to medication use. The distribution of root causes of
surgical and emergency medicine units showed more
mutual similarities than those of internal medicine units.
Conclusions: Comparable incidents and causes have
been found in all units, but there were also differences
between units and unit types. Unit-based incident
reporting gives specific information and therefore makes
improvements easier. We conclude that unit-based
incident reporting has an added value besides hospital-
wide or national reporting systems that already exist in
various countries.
INTRODUCTION
Considerable effort has been put into estab-
lishing incident reporting and learning
systems in healthcare. The ﬁrst reporting
systems in healthcare were introduced more
than a decade ago, following the examples of
reporting systems in other high-risk indus-
tries such as aviation, nuclear power and the
chemical process industry.1 Incident report-
ing systems in healthcare are systematically
ﬁlled with information on adverse events
and near misses, with the aim of identifying
basic risk factors and thus enabling health-
care providers to improve their quality of
care. For this purpose, reporting should
be non-punitive, conﬁdential or anonymous,
independent, timely, systems oriented and
responsive, and it should enable a systematic
root cause analysis.2
By now, various countries have established
national incident reporting systems generat-
ing several thousands of reports each year.
Well known is the National Reporting and
Learning System (NRLS) for England and
Wales.3 It has spread out since 2003 and
received over a million reports in a period of
5 years, mainly from acute care hospitals.4
From 2010, it became mandatory for
National Health Service (NHS) trusts in
England to report all serious patient safety
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This is a large multicentre study conducted in 30
hospital units of 20 hospitals across the
Netherlands.
▪ Incident reporting and feedback was unit based.
▪ Incidents with and without harm for patients
were reported and analysed, because other high-
risk industries have shown that incidents without
harm occur more frequently and seem to have
the same root causes than incidents with harm
(adverse events).
▪ Staff members were interviewed about the
written incident report to gain insight into under-
lying causes.
▪ All incidents may not have been reported during
the study period, as incident reporting depends
on the willingness of the care professionals to
report; almost all incidents were reported by
nurses.
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incidents to the Care Quality Commission as part of the
Care Quality Commission registration process.5 Other
systems are the US Veterans Administration,6 the
Medical Event Reporting System (MERS)7 and the
national system for incident reporting in Canada.8 A
recent overview of existing systems has been given by the
Reporting and Learning subgroup of the European
Commission.9
Less clear is whether the results of these national systems
are applicable to hospital units, the very places where
changes and improvements have to be implemented. The
national ﬁgures on incident types and root causes do not
necessarily reﬂect the risks of a speciﬁc hospital unit or
unit type. Possible differences could be related to the type
of care delivered, the urgency of the care or the depend-
ency on other care units for the care process of the own
care unit. Unspeciﬁc feedback might be a barrier for
change and improvement, because incidents that are not
relevant for their daily practice might not engage teams.
The literature on implementation has shown that results
from other organisations get less accepted and hinder the
acceptance of necessary changes.10 11
For that reason, the government and healthcare provi-
ders in the Netherlands have opted for a local and
decentralised unit-based approach12 13 instead of a
general national reporting system for hospitals. Dutch
hospital units have, in general, 20–30 beds of one or
more specialty, for example, cardiology, surgery, neur-
ology, internal medicine. Healthcare providers can
report incidents, deﬁned as any unintended event that
could have harmed or did harm a patient, to a small
trained team of colleagues, who analyse the process and
system failures.
The assumption of the unit-based reporting system is
that (1) incidents differ between units and unit types,
and (2) incidents that are reported and analysed at the
unit where the incident has happened will create a
greater sense of urgency, and therefore more willingness
to change practice. On the other hand, when incident
types and root causes do not differ between unit types,
then a national system is more efﬁcient. Until now, no
speciﬁc analyses have been conducted on existing
unit-based incident reporting systems.
This article focuses on the ﬁrst assumption and looks for
variations in incident types and root causes reported in
unit-based reporting systems in hospitals. The main
research questions are: (1) What is the number of incidents
reported in participating units? (2) What are the types of
incidents, consequences for patients and root causes of
reported incidents at unit level? (3) Are there differences
in types and causes of incidents between types of units?
METHODS
Study design and setting
From October 2006 to February 2008, an observational
study was performed to examine patient safety incidents
at 30 hospital units of 20 hospitals in the Netherlands.
The data of the study were gathered some time ago, but
there has been no comparable study yet and the
research questions are still valid and awaiting answers.
The units of our study were of three different types
(each type having 10 units), representing the core of
hospital care: emergency medicine,14 surgery15 and
internal medicine.16 The data collection within the units
took place in phases with a study period of 5–14 weeks
per unit, depending on the reporting speed, to reach
the advisable minimum of 50 incident reports per unit.
When the number of reports is at least 50, the variety of
possible patient safety incidents can be captured and a
valid causal factor proﬁle drawn up.17 The study proto-
col was granted ethical approval by the VU University
Medical Center review board in Amsterdam.
Healthcare providers (ie, nurses, resident physicians,
medical consultants) at the unit were asked to report all
patient safety incidents, directly after the incident had
occurred or was discovered. Patient safety incidents were
broadly deﬁned as all events, no matter how seemingly
trivial or commonplace, that were unintended and
could have harmed or did harm a patient.18
Data collection
Reporting procedure
Before the start of the study, the staff received oral and
written instructions about the aim and procedure of the
study. They had two alternatives for the initial reporting
of patient safety incidents: a pocketsize report card or a
report form (either the report form developed for this
study, or the report form that was already used by the
hospital unit). On the report card, the name of the
reporter, the moment in time and a short description of
the incident were requested. The report form was more
elaborate and additionally requested the involvement of
the reporter in the incident, the phase of care, place,
some patient characteristics and consequences for the
patient. The reporters used the report card when they
had no time to write down all details about the incident.
A locked mailbox was placed in either the team or resi-
dent room, to drop the report cards and forms into.
After each report, the researcher asked additional ques-
tions in a short interview. During these interviews, ques-
tions about the reported incidents and their context
factors were asked. When the report was made on a
report card, this interview took more time than when
the detailed report form was ﬁlled out beforehand. No
interviews were held with staff in hospital units other
than the participating units.
Once or twice a week a researcher or trained nurse
from outside the hospital visited the participating unit to
collect the written reports and to interview the reporters.
Occasionally, questions were asked by telephone.
Healthcare professionals were encouraged to report
by means of bi-monthly newsletters giving information
on types and numbers of incidents, and reminders
during team meetings to direct staff’s attention to
reporting.
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PRISMA analysis
All patient safety incidents were analysed by trained
researchers using PRISMA-medical. PRISMA is a tool to
analyse the root causes of a broad set of incidents.19 20
The corresponding taxonomy with their categories and
subcategories (see online supplementary appendix 1) to
classify the root causes, the Eindhoven Classiﬁcation
Model (ECM), was used as a foundational component
for the conceptual framework for the WHO World
Alliance for Patient Safety’s International Classiﬁcation
for Patient Safety.21
In general, PRISMA examines the relative contribu-
tions of latent factors (technical and organisational),
active failures (human) and other factors (patient-
related and other). Incidents are analysed in three main
steps when using PRISMA. First, a causal tree is formu-
lated. A short description of the incident is placed at the
top of the tree, as the starting point for the analysis.
Below the top event, all involved direct causes are men-
tioned. These direct causes often have their own causes.
By continuing to ask ‘why’ for each event or action,
beginning with the top event, the relevant causes can be
revealed. In this way, a structure of causes arises, until
the reporter cannot give any more factual information
of underlying causes. The questioning also stops when
the underlying cause lies outside the unit or hospital.
Moreover, a lack of organisational or technical barriers
is not labelled as an organisational or technical cause.
An example: an electronic signal system for registration
of medication can prevent an allergic reaction or double
gift, but as long as such a system does not exist, this
system can and will not be regarded as a cause. However,
improvements of organisational procedures or techni-
ques can arise from the identiﬁcation of human errors.
In the second phase, the identiﬁed root causes are classi-
ﬁed with the ECM.
Statistical analyses
The incidents were classiﬁed into one of the eight
types that were formulated after completion of the
study, by looking at common themes in the reported
incidents: Materials and equipment, Diagnosis and
treatment, Medication, Protocols and regulations,
Incorrect data and substitutions, Collaboration with
resident physicians and consultants, Collaboration with
other departments and Other.
The data of the reports were ﬁrst summarised using
descriptive statistics and frequency tables with 95% CIs.
The 95% CIs were calculated using the simultaneous CI
procedure for multinomial proportions.22 Differences
between the three unit types in the incidences of inci-
dent types and root causes were examined using multi-
nomial logistic regression analyses. The analyses of
incident types were performed with 2028 unique cases
(N=2028 incidents); the analyses of root causes (main
categories) were performed with 3015 cases (N=3015
root causes). Subcategories of root causes were only ana-
lysed for the two most frequently scored main categories:
human causes (N=2120) and organisational causes
(N=521). SPSS V.20 and SAS V.9.2 were used to perform
the statistical analyses.
RESULTS
Number of reports
A total of 2028 patient safety incidents were reported:
522 incidents in emergency medicine units, 881 inci-
dents in surgical units and 625 incidents in units for
internal medicine. The mean number of incident
reports per unit was 52 (range 46–71) in emergency
units, 88 (range 36–180) in surgical units and 63 (range
44–99) in internal medicine units. More than 80% of
the reports were made by nurses, <10% by resident phy-
sicians or medical consultants and about 10% by other
healthcare staff.
Types of incidents
All 2028 incident were classiﬁed into 1 of 8 incident cat-
egories (table 1). Nearly one-third of the incidents
(29%) were related to medication. This includes medica-
tion preparation, administration and registration. In
15% of the incidents, there were problems with materi-
als or equipment, such as defects of equipment or
absence of necessary materials. In another 15% the inci-
dents were related to problems with collaboration
between departments.
The distribution of incidents per unit type differed. In
general, most differences can be seen between emer-
gency and internal medicine units. There were signiﬁ-
cant differences between all three unit types in the
number of incidents in the categories Materials and
equipment and Other. Incidents in units of emergency
medicine were most often related to the collaboration
between units, whereas surgical and internal medicine
units most often reported medication-related incidents.
Consequences for patients
In more than half of the incidents (56% emergency,
62% surgery, 62% internal medicine), there were conse-
quences for the patient. Between 3% and 10% (3%
emergency, 6% surgery, 10% internal medicine) of the
incidents involved physical injuries, for example, gastric
bleeding when a protective drug was not administered
or renal insufﬁciency because the patient had not
received NaCl liquid for days. Mostly, consequences con-
cerned suboptimal care (30% emergency, 41% surgery,
45% medicine) or inconvenience (45% emergency, 25%
surgery, 11% medicine). An example of suboptimal care
is a delay in starting the prescribed medication or
administering less medication than prescribed, without
observed consequences. Examples of inconvenience are:
unnecessarily not being allowed to eat and drink before
an operation, and long waiting times (eg, for medical
consultant, physical examination, X-ray).
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Table 1 Percentages and CIs of various types of incidents for all units and per unit type
Types of incidents
Emergency medicine
N=522
Surgery
N=881
Internal medicine
N=625
Total
N=2028
Collaboration between units*† 24.5 (20.5 to 28.9) 10.2 (7.0 to 13.5) 12.2 (8.3 to 16.0) 14.5 (12.4 to 16.7)
Eg, long waiting time for laboratory test results
Eg, incomplete handover from other department
Eg, difficulties finding a place for the patient in a nursing ward
Collaboration with (resident) physicians†‡ 17.0 (13.0 to 21.4) 10.1 (6.9 to 13.4) 5.0 (1.1 to 8.8) 10.3 (8.2 to 12.5)
Eg, long waiting time for resident or consultant to arrive
Eg, insufficient supervision of resident physicians
Eg, not able to reach resident or consultant
Medication*† 7.3 (3.3 to 11.6) 33.0 (29.9 to 36.3) 41.9 (38.1 to 45.8) 29.1 (27.1 to 31.3)
Eg, prescription of medicine at incorrect dose
Eg, medication expired
Eg, medication instruction repeated twice
Diagnosis and treatment‡ 14.4 (10.3 to 18.7) 11.1 (8.0 to 14.4) 11.2 (7.4 to 15.1) 12.0 (9.9 to 14.1)
Eg, no assessment of amylase in drain fluid
Eg, eyelid glued when gluing nose bridge
Eg, no treatment for patient with wounds (pressure ulcers)
Materials and equipment*†‡ 20.3 (16.3 to 24.7) 15.6 (12.4 to 18.8) 8.5 (4.6 to 12.3) 14.6 (12.5 to 16.8)
Eg, materials out of stock
Eg, error in electronic record system
(unable to look up medical history of patient)
Eg, examination cancelled because of defective radiology equipment
Incorrect data and substitutions†‡ 7.5 (3.5 to 11.8) 5.9 (2.7 to 9.2) 3.2 (0 to 7.1) 5.5 (3.4 to 7.6)
Eg, incorrect date on X-ray
Eg, recovery nurse presents wrong patient to surgical department
Eg, sticker with personal information of wrong
patient pasted on laboratory request form
Protocols and regulations*† 3.8 (0 to 8.2) 4.7 (1.5 to 7.9) 9.0 (5.1 to 12.8) 5.8 (3.7 to 7.9)
Eg, inconsistency in protocols
Eg, protocol untraceable on the intranet
Eg, staff not familiar with procedure in new protocol
Other*†‡ 5.2 (1.2 to 9.5) 9.4 (6.2 to 12.7) 9.1 (5.3 to 13.0) 8.2 (6.2 to 10.4)
Eg, fall
Eg, loss of patient record
Eg, patient leaves hospital without being discharged
Total 100 100 100 100
*Significant difference between emergency medicine and surgery; p<0.05.
†Significant difference between emergency medicine and internal medicine; p<0.05.
‡Significant difference between surgery and internal medicine; p<0.05.
4
W
agner
C,etal.BM
J
Open
2016;6:e011277.doi:10.1136/bm
jopen-2016-011277
O
p
e
n
A
c
c
e
s
s
group.bmj.com
 o
n
 M
ay 30, 2017 - Published by 
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Root causes of reported incidents
All 2028 incidents were analysed with PRISMA, resulting
in 3015 root causes (ie, 845 in emergency medicine
units, 1250 in surgery units, 920 in internal medicine
units). Of all root causes, 70% were human, 17% were
organisational, 7% were technical and 6% were cate-
gorised as patient-related or other (table 2). The three
unit types had a different distribution of root causes. In
general, more commonalities can be seen between surgi-
cal and emergency medicine units compared with in
internal medicine units. The number of causes related
to human factors signiﬁcantly differed between all three
unit types. Units of emergency medicine had the fewest
patient-related causes, whereas units of internal medi-
cine had the fewest organisational and technical causes.
The distributions of human and organisational root
cause subcategories differed between unit types (tables 3
and 4). Several smaller and larger signiﬁcant differences
have been found between the three unit types. The most
frequently occurring human root cause was related to
faulty task planning and execution (intervention)
(37%). Another frequent cause was a missing or faulty
veriﬁcation process (13%). Of the organisational root
causes, 20% were related to safety culture and 19% to
management priorities. The results show that emergency
medicine units have a higher percentage of both human
and organisational external root cause categories
(causes outside the unit) than do surgery and internal
medicine units. In addition, in emergency units, an
incorrect ﬁt between the qualiﬁcations of hospital staff
and the task to be performed is more often a cause of
incidents than in internal medicine units. Internal medi-
cine units have more causes related to the veriﬁcation of
the situation before starting an intervention, compared
with the other two unit types. Surgical and internal
medicine units had more intervention related causes
than emergency medicine units. With regard to organ-
isational causes, the results show that emergency medi-
cine units have more causes related to transfer of
knowledge and less causes related to culture than the
other two unit types.
DISCUSSION
Principle findings
In general, the most frequently reported incidents were
related to collaboration between units, medication, and
materials and equipment. The most common root
causes were human and organisational factors. About
one-third of the human and organisational root causes
originated outside the participating units. The most
common human root cause was intervention-related,
meaning that the right thing has been carried out by
the caregiver, but not in the right way. Another frequent
cause was a missing or faulty veriﬁcation process.
One-ﬁfth of the organisational root causes were related
Table 2 Percentages and CIs of main categories of root causes for all units and per unit type
Root cause type (main category)
Emergency medicine
N=845
Surgery
N=1250
Internal medicine
N=920
Total
N=3015
Human*†‡ 60.2 (56.9 to 63.7) 72.1 (69.7 to 74.6) 76.7 (74.7 to 79.4) 70.2 (68.6 to 71.8)
Organisational†‡ 25.0 (21.7 to 28.4) 16.1 (13.7 to 18.6) 11.8 (9.2 to 14.5) 17.3 (15.7 to 18.9)
Technical†‡ 10.8 (7.5 to 14.2) 5.7 (3.3 to 8.2) 5.1 (2.5 to 7.7) 6.9 (5.3 to 8.6)
Patient related/other*† 4.0 (0.7 to 7.4) 6.2 (3.8 to 8.6) 6.3 (3.7 to 8.9) 5.6 (4.0 to 7.3)
Total 100 100 100 100
*Significant difference between emergency medicine and surgery; p<0.05.
†Significant difference between emergency medicine and internal medicine; p<0.05.
‡Significant difference between surgery and internal medicine; p<0.05.
Table 3 Percentages of human root cause subcategories for all units and per unit type
Human root cause type
(subcategory)
Emergency
medicine
N=510
Surgery
N=904
Internal
medicine
N=706
Total
N=2120
External*† 51.0 (46.9 to 55.5) 31.4 (28.0 to 34.9) 17.0 (13.3 to 20.9) 31.3 (29.1 to 33.6)
Knowledge-based behaviour 5.9 (1.8 to 10.4) 3.7 (0.2 to 7.1) 3.1 (0 to 7.0) 4.0 (1.8 to 6.3)
Qualifications* 3.1 (0 to 7.6) 1.2 (0 to 4.7) 0.6 (0 to 4.4) 1.5 (0 to 3.8)
Coordination‡ 6.7 (2.6 to 11.1) 6.1 (2.7 to 9.5) 6.8 (3.1 to 10.7) 6.5 (4.3 to 8.8)
Verification*†‡ 10.2 (6.1 to 14.7) 11.1 (7.6 to 14.5) 18.8 (15.2 to 22.7) 13.4 (11.2 to 15.7)
Intervention*‡ 16.1 (12.0 to 20.6) 41.2 (37.7 to 44.6) 46.6 (42.9 to 50.5) 36.9 (34.7 to 39.2)
Monitoring‡ 5.5 (1.4 to 10.0) 5.2 (1.8 to 8.6) 5.9 (2.3 to 9.8) 5.5 (3.3 to 7.8)
Other 1.6 (0 to 6.0) 0.2 (0 to 3.7) 1.1 (0 to 5.0) 0.8 (0 to 3.1)
Total 100 100 100 100
*Significant difference between emergency medicine and internal medicine; p<0.05.
†Significant difference between surgery and internal medicine; p<0.05.
‡Significant difference between emergency medicine and surgery; p<0.05.
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to safety culture and management priorities. This
general picture changes if we look more closely into the
separate results of the three unit types. The results
showed that there are differences in reported incident
types that can be related to the unit type, for example,
most incidents on collaboration with other units were
reported in emergency units, whereas medication inci-
dents were frequently reported in surgery and general
medicine units. The three unit types also had different
distributions of root causes, with most similarities
between the surgical and emergency medicine units.
Relation with previous research
Various articles have described incidents of speciﬁc spe-
cialities or departments,23–27 but no comparison of inci-
dents and root causes between different hospital unit
types has been made before. Pronovost, for example,
described the results of voluntary and anonymous web-
based incident reporting in the US Intensive Care Unit
Safety Reporting System (Patient Safety Reporting
System, PSRS). The 23 participating intensive care units
(ICUs) reported 2075 incidents in 2 years. Common
event types were medication, incorrect care delivery and
line/tube/drain incidents. Contributing factors were
deﬁciencies in training and teamwork issues. In con-
trast to our study, no speciﬁc unit-based feedback was
given because the reporter could elect on whether to
identify his/her ICU.24 Another study of critical inci-
dents in two UK emergency departments (EDs)
revealed 443 critical incidents over a 12-month period.
Common root causes were related to organisational
issues outside the EDs, internal management issues and
human errors (knowledge or task veriﬁcation and exe-
cution). The authors also found signiﬁcant differences
between the EDs.25 Compared with both studies, we
found in our study a larger willingness of healthcare
professionals to report incidents (on average 50 inci-
dents in 2 months), but the results regarding root
causes are similar.
In contrast to our study, research based on national
reporting systems often describes large numbers and
types of incidents, but lacks an analysis of underlying
root causes, which is easier to set up in unit-based
reporting systems.28–30
Strengths and limitations
In this large multicentre study, we analysed incidents
with and without harm to patients, because other high-
risk industries have shown that incidents without harm
are also worth analysing and occur more frequently than
incidents with harm (adverse events).31 They seem to
have the same root causes and contributing factors as
adverse events. Therefore, learning can take place
before patients are harmed.32
To gain insight into the quality of care, it is necessary
to know more about the types of incidents, their root
causes and the possibility of changing the context in
which incidents occur.33 But, besides the report of an
incident, a discussion with those involved at a local level
can lead to a deeper understanding. To facilitate this dis-
cussion, we gave participating units in our study more
insight into their quality of care because of our knowl-
edge of their speciﬁc root causes and context.
Our study has some limitations. First, it is possible that
not all incidents were reported during the study period,
as incident reporting depends on the willingness of care
professionals to carry out. We do not know whether
knowing that researchers would ask questions about the
causes of an incident would inhibit care professionals
from reporting. This may have biased our results, but we
cannot be sure towards which direction. Second, most
unintended events were reported by nurses.
Consequently, the study mainly gives an idea about inci-
dents related to nursing care and to a lesser extent to
care processes by residents and consultants in the units.
Another limitation is related to the identiﬁcation of
root causes. Different researchers have interviewed the
reporters. This may have introduced variation in the
information gathered by the researchers. To minimise
this effect, we trained the researchers extensively. A reli-
ability study on the inter-rater reliability showed positive
results. The inter-rater reliability for the number of root
causes used in the causal tree was moderate (κ 0.45).
The inter-rater reliability of classifying root causes with
the ECM taxonomy was moderate to substantial at main
category level (κ 0.70) and subcategory level (complete
taxonomy) (κ 0.63).17 Another study found similar
results for the main category level (κ 0.70–0.81) and less
positive results for the subcategories (0.40–0.47).34
Table 4 Percentages of organisational root cause subcategories for all units and per unit type
Organisational root
cause type (subcategory)
Emergency medicine
N=211
Surgery
N=201
Internal medicine
N=109
Total
N=521
External*†‡ 50.7 (44.1 to 57.5) 27.9 (20.9 to 35.2) 22.9 (13.8 to 32.6) 36.1 (31.7 to 40.5)
Protocols 8.5 (1.9 to 15.3) 12.4 (5.5 to 19.8) 20.2 (11.0 to 29.8) 12.5 (8.1 to 16.9)
Transfer of knowledge*† 16.6 (10.0 to 23.4) 8.0 (1.0 to 15.3) 12.8 (3.7 to 22.5) 12.5 (8.1 to 16.9)
Management priorities‡ 15.2 (8.5 to 22.0) 21.4 (14.4 to 28.7) 22.9 (13.8 to 32.6) 19.2 (14.8 to 23.6)
Culture*‡ 9.0 (2.4 to 15.8) 30.3 (23.4 to 37.7) 21.1 (11.9 to 30.7) 19.8 (15.4 to 24.2)
Total 100 100 100 100
*Significant difference between emergency medicine and surgery; p<0.05.
†Significant difference between emergency medicine and internal medicine; p<0.05.
‡Significant difference between surgery and internal medicine; p<0.05.
6 Wagner C, et al. BMJ Open 2016;6:e011277. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-011277
Open Access
group.bmj.com on May 30, 2017 - Published by http://bmjopen.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
Finally, the interviews about the events depend on the
recall of the reporter. However, we strived for a small
time lag between the occurrence of the incident and the
interview.
Conclusion and implications
A decentralised incident reporting system is valuable if
hospital units differ in the incidents that occur and in
the underlying root causes. We found signiﬁcant differ-
ences in incident types and especially root causes
between emergency, surgery and internal medicine
units. This means that it is important for hospital units
to get insight into their own local pattern of root causes
and prioritise improvement activities based on weak
spots in their speciﬁc system. This can be achieved more
easily in a unit-based incident reporting and feedback
system than by a hospital-wide or even national reporting
system providing aggregated general information back to
all units. Furthermore, the opportunity to obtain elabo-
rated information concerning the circumstances of the
incident is important for improvement and more easily
achieved in local reporting systems.
The next step, after reporting and analysing incidents,
is actual learning and change in daily practice to
prevent incidents from happening again. Future
research should focus on effective strategies to change
behaviour and learn from the incidents that have
occurred. This change should be based on thorough
insight into the incident types and their root causes at
unit level. Direct and immediate feedback to healthcare
professionals is extremely important, to keep them con-
tinuously engaged. A database with information on types
of incidents and types of root causes may help to iden-
tify trends, record contributory factors and allow units to
monitor changes over time.
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